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MAIN THESES OF THE REPORT: 
1. Participation in the Iraqi operation is the most controversial undertaking in Polish foreign and 
security policy during the last 15 years. It wasn't preceded by a sufficiently thorough analysis 
of profits and losses for foreign and domestic policy, or by justifications convincing the majority 
of citizens. These are some of the reasons why about 70 percent of the public are opposed to it. 
The fact that the use of the army in a complicated and dramatic situation such as the Iraqi 
mission, (that has already lasted over one and a half years) would have such clear domestic 
implications, was not appreciated. 
 
2. For the political authorities the decision to support the USA in Iraq were arrived at by treating 
the United States as its main NATO ally and the final guarantor of security for Poland. 
A reasonable question however, is whether it was in the Polish interest to develop long term 
special relations with only one super - power, and if this would bring costs relative to its relations 
with other partners, especially those from the European Union. However, long term American 
presence in Europe; can counteract the resurgence of nationalist defense policies of the larger 
European countries, which are not in the Polish interest. An American defeat in Iraq would carry 
some negative consequences for Polish national security policy.  
 
3. Engagement far distant from the borders of Poland indirectly brings security and prominence 
to our country, nevertheless, as in other countries; a question remains as to the legitimacy 
of using power. 
 
4. The stabilization mission, which was handed over to Polish units based on the mandate 
of government and the President, has so far been handled (on the basis of the available 
information) unerringly, without diminishing the prestige of the state and army. 
 
5. It is a pity that during the entire period of engagement in Iraq there has been no single 
coherent vision, comprehensible to the public as to the duration and scope of the presence 
of the Polish contingent in Iraq. This is a convincing reason for the extent of military engagement 
to depend on the progress of stabilization in Iraq. A sudden reversal would be irresponsible 
(unless a developing situation was to threaten soldiers' lives) and would arouse suspicion as 
to the intentions of such a decision. However, gradual withdrawal under stabilized conditions 
in Iraq, is desirable and rational both from the point of view of relations among allies in the 
so-called anti - Iraqi coalition, and the expectations of large part of Polish society. It is difficult 
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to say whether Polish politicians' statements in the second half of October 2004, (that is 
up to the moment of finalizing this report) indicate returning to the earlier formula, namely that 
the military presence in Iraq is determined by the current local situation, or whether the deadline 
of withdrawal -after the elections in Iraq planned for the beginning of the next year - will instead 
be defined ad hoc. 
 
6. Participation in the "Iraqi Freedom" operation has yielded a great deal of valuable information 
regarding the operational abilities and organization of the military forces of many countries, 
portraying the developing tendencies of modern armies. Much of this information can be used 
in the course of the improvement and modernization of the Polish Army and is already being 
included in the program of development through the year 2010. Creating expeditionary forces 
will make things easier. Never before has Poland had command over such a large, multinational 
military formation as in the "Iraqi Freedom" mission and has never had this kind of opportunity 
to gain such valuable experience. 
  
ISSUE OF A NATIONAL DIMENSION  
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE POLISH PRESENCE  
We can conclude from the reactions of varied centers of opinion, that taking part in the Iraqi 
operation and participation in its next phases  is probably the most controversial undertaking 
in Polish foreign and security policy during the last 15 years. Decisions regarding the 
participation of Polish armed forces in both stages of the Iraqi operation: first in armed 
intervention and then in the stabilization mission, came about (contrary to the statements 
of politicians) relatively quickly and easily. This opinion does not have to mean that both 
decisions did not relate in an important way to the entirety of Polish foreign and security policy. 
At least this is the way it first seemed. 
 
One could conclude that for political authorities, decisions came first of all from the Polish 
commitment to co-operate with the United States which has been ever since our efforts 
to become a member of NATO, treated as our most important ally and the final guarantor of our 
safety. These decisions were a continuation of the pro-American attitude in the conflict between 
the transatlantic partners, expressed in the famous "letter of eight"1 in January 2003. They had, 
                                                          
1 "Europe and America Must Stand United'', London, 30 January 2003, http://number-
10.gov.uk/output/page1405.asp/19.10.2004. 
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it seemed, a strategic dimension. That political act, which the letter was recognized 
as, practically forecast the intervention in Iraq, referring to " transatlantic bonds" and also 
to weapons of mass destruction, which turned out to be one of reasons for the future 
intervention. 
 
However more and more Polish observers notice that principle decisions were not preceded by 
a satisfactory public debate, including parliamentary debate, or by a deep analysis of profits and 
losses which would be the future consequences of the Iraqi operation for the foreign and 
domestic policy of Poland. Arguments "for" and "against" were brought up only after 
engagement in this action, and actually only after the first mortalities and the first political 
defeats. Also under the influence of external events, such as the acknowledgment by the USA, 
Great Britain and Australia, that they were mistaken in regards to Iraqi possession of weapons 
of mass destruction. But these incorrect assumptions affected Polish public opinion less than 
their disappointment, that support for USA didn't bring Poland measurable benefits. As many as 
70 percent of Poles pointed this out, seeing the need to establish a connection between support 
for the USA and American help for our country. 
 
For the year and a half since the beginning of the operation, the decision to participate 
in the Iraqi mission has not been contested by the majority of Poland’s governmental and 
opposition authorities, parties represented in parliament, nor parties unrepresented in the 
parliament. Criticism of Polish participation first came from analysts, judging that the unequivocal 
declaration by Poland of support for America puts at risk our position in the European Union, 
and European foreign security and defense policy, which is only now beginning to be shaped. 
Disappointment is also being expressed that a declaration of support for American policy does 
not bring with it the expected benefits connected with trade and visa policy.  
 
It was only later, when it became clear that engagement in Iraq is related not only 
to international policy but also very much to internal policy, that very basic questions were asked 
such as questions about the process of decision making and justifications for it. One of the best-
known constitutionalists estimated (but not before August 2004), that "the President 
of the Republic of Poland, the succeeding Prime Ministers, and the minister of foreign affairs 
have not managed so far to introduce justifications which are considered to be fully satisfactory. 
Because the months of our Iraqi "adventure" are passing and there is little sign of it coming to 
a happy conclusion, one should... ask questions about its justification and expect that answers 
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would be given to Poles. Then he added that, "the questions about the Polish presence in Iraq 
belong to these kinds of colloquial questions, which don’t have to be meaningless merely 
because they come from a layman. The issue with which they are concerned with are matter 
of national importance"2  
 
Public opinion is becoming more and more opposed to Polish engagement in Iraq. That is why 
a plan for withdrawal of the Polish contingent became one of the foundations of the program 
of Prime Minister Marek Belka's government. The calendar was being prepared for reducing 
military presence, starting at the end January or the beginning of February 2005, which is 
the time of the planned elections and also the beginning of the fourth shift of the Polish 
contingent. Polish military participation in the stabilization mission was driven by a philosophy 
linking its scope mainly to the situation in Iraq itself. Meaning that military presence was 
dependent on the internal security and political stability of the former state of Saddam Hussein. 
Therefore it was difficult to rule out the possibility of enlarging the contingent. 
 
Polish authorities were claiming instead that sudden or total withdrawal of the Polish contingent 
from Iraq, the contingent, which is the core of the multinational division under Polish command, 
would be irresponsible, and it would expose Iraq to serious destabilization. 
 
The essential change in the perception of Polish participation in the stabilization operation came 
with a famous statement by the Minister of National Defense, Jerzy Szmajdziński3. 
In an interview for Gazeta Wyborcza in October 2004 he gave - as the first government official – 
a "deadline" for withdrawal of the Polish contingent as December 2005, this being the expiration 
date of UN Security Council Resolution No. 15464. In the above-mentioned interview 
Szmajdziński no longer linked Polish military presence with the situation in Iraq. Gazeta 
Wyborcza wrote: "Now Szmajdziński tells us that withdrawal of units should not be dependent on 
the developing situation in Iraq". This statement further weakens the political agreement, which 
was already very fragile, over the purpose of keeping armed forces in Iraq for the goals 
of stabilization mission. This factor causes a deepening of differences between the Polish 
establishment and Polish society in regard to the various directions of foreign policy. 
                                                          
2 Piotr Winczorek, "Why Did We Go There? Questions about Poland and Iraq" Rzeczpspolita, 12th of 
August 2004. 
3 Interview “We Are Leaving", Gazeta Wyborcza, 4th of October 2004. 
4 The Security Council, Resolution 1546, 8 June 2004, http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ 
N04/381/16/ PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement/19.10.2003 
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THREATS NEAR OR FAR? 
From the perspective of the time that has passed since Poland first engaged in the Iraqi 
operation, the main arguments for involvement are the following: 
Political and military engagement were understood to be, especially during the first phase, 
a long-term investment in the future security of the international community, including Poland. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz wrote in the Gazeta Wyborcza, that: 
"We decided to participate in the war with terrorism not only because of our feeling 
of responsibility to an ally told us to - the value of which can not be overestimated - but first of all 
because of our conviction, that by participating in the coalition we contribute to the creation 
of a safe future." And further: "It would have been tragic if we had waited while understanding 
this- till the moment when terrorism caught up to us in our own land". 
 
Since the beginning of the Iraqi operation, there has been a conviction that military engagement 
far beyond the borders of Poland brings us security. This argument does not convince everyone 
from a psychological or political stand point, and even less so from a military standpoint. 
It is about a belief, that participating in a coalition with the USA and other countries will give 
Poland a guarantee of security for the future. As regards the other issue, namely the conviction, 
that in the case of the necessity to defend our country, that an American ally or the North-
Atlantic Alliance would come to the aid of Poland, the opinions are divided. The Minister 
of National Defense, Jerzy Szmajdziński, stressed that: "Such is the soldier's fate that one 
should be ready to act not only within the borders of our country, but also far beyond it, for the 
world's security. The world's security is also security for Poland. And often preventing danger 
in its infancy costs considerably less than in a situation, in which we deal with a direct threat." 
 
When on the 6th of November 2003 the media released information about the first Polish 
mortality in Iraq, the then Prime Minister, Leszek Miller, visiting soldiers at their base, affirmed, 
that this fact would not influence the government's position in the matter of our presence in Iraq 
because - as he repeated - our participation in fighting terrorism is the fight for our own security. 
From that moment on, the government seemed determined to proceed with the military mission 
even in the most difficult situations caused by deaths of soldiers, civil workers, and journalists. 
Poland is one of the countries keeping its army in Iraq (Since the beginning of August 2004), 
who have announced that they will not negotiate with terrorists, kidnapers of hostages or those 
trying in this way to extort their withdrawal. 
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Therefore it seems, that one of the main arguments for participation in the Iraqi operation in both 
its phases was the declaration of its will to oppose terrorism - politically and militarily. 
It was assumed that this is about their commitment to defending the values of the democratic 
world, to which Poland belongs; doing it in such a way as to keep the "enemy" far away from 
Polish territory and to do so, if possible, with our own coalition, preferably with the USA and 
NATO. 
 
Even during the most difficult moments of the Iraqi mission its purpose of fighting against 
Saddam Hussein’s regime and terrorism, was not questioned. Doubts arose, however, when 
democratic values were mentioned, because it was believed that in a country outside 
of the Euro-Atlantic area and western civilization, it was not possible to introduce a democracy 
consistent with our understanding of this notion. 
One of the primary motives of the American, British, Australian and Polish intervention was 
to "scare away" - in the example of Iraq - countries who represented a risk to the security 
of the western world, including economic security. With the same purpose the United States 
applied a highly controversial, (among the other transatlantic partners) "preventive strategy", 
together with a "pre-emptive strike". It is worth mentioning that before the intervention in Iraq, 
Syria was given a warning, which was so tough, that speculation arose as to the possibility 
of an attack on this country. 
 
For quite a long time the weapons of mass destruction argument seemed credible to a majority 
of observers, especially because Prime Minister Leszek Miller, after meeting with American 
politicians in Washington, at the beginning of February last year, recognized that the suitable 
resolution of the Security Council, forbidding possession of weapons of mass destruction had 
been broken by Iraq, and that there was proof5. At a conference held at the National Defense 
Academy in December 2003, the then Vice Minister of National Defense, Andrzej Towpik stated 
that it was possible to theorize, that if not for the terrorist attacks of the 11th of September 2001, 
the dangers of Hussein's policy would have been seen so clear.6 "In fact there was no doubt, 
that Hussein possessed chemical and bacteriological weapons". But at the same time 
the remark was made that the fundamental question was not the possession of weapons 
                                                          
5 Bartosz Weglarczyk, "Prime Minister Miller Visiting President Bush", Gazeta Wyborcza, 5th of February 
2003. 
6 Andrzej Towpik, "Political and Military Aspects of 'the Iraqi Freedom' Operation", in: ”Iraqi Freedom' 
Operation", The Academy of National Defense, Warsaw 2003. 
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of mass destruction, but if there was a threat of their use.  
 
This was a characteristic approach, showing – among other things - that Poland, wanting 
to implement a long term pro-American policy, sought justification. Probably the most forceful 
example of this approach was a statement by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski during a UN 
forum in January 2003, that weapons inspectors should still be given the opportunity to search 
for the WMD. Another example was - the army's attempt to prove that warheads with toxic 
substances were found in Iraq, although this could have been done with the intention of proving 
their existence by the Military Information Services in the face of criticism of their actions. 
However, the indicator, showing some doubts about the existence of weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq, was the President's statement in March of this year, that suggested that 
Poland was misled concerning their existence. 
 
Vice Minister Towpik said that taking into account current situation in Iraq one should restrain 
oneself from strong opinions. He mentioned, however, the following possible consequences 
of the "Iraqi Freedom" operation; elimination of the threat of destabilization by Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, discontinuation of "illegal" operations with the WMD, limitation of support for 
international terrorism; as well as directing a clear warning towards other countries conducting 
illegal operations with WMD and supporting terrorism, such as Iran, Syria and North Korea; 
having serious repercussions on the geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf region and 
the Middle East.7  
 
If we were to accept this statement as pointing at motives for the use of the army 
in the undertaking of the operation and as justification for Polish participation, then one should 
recognize, that one and a half years of armed intervention are not commensurate with these 
assumptions. 
 
Some Polish analysts have pointed out at the beginning of the intervention in Iraq, that it could 
bring the international community closer to resolution of the arms control issue. They estimated 
that Libya would not be prone to accept control of its own arsenal, if not for the deterrent power 
used in the Persian Gulf. The successful end of intervention in Iraq – the introduction of order 
in public life according to the norms of civilized countries - could, according to only few opinions, 
contribute to stabilization in the whole region and the creation of a so called Bigger Middle East. 
                                                          
7 Therein 
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The majority of Polish analysts, however, have eventually advocated opposing arguments. They 
have argued - as Witold Waszczykowski from the Foreign Office said - that "dealing with 
Saddam Hussein did not reduce the wave of terrorist operations, and did increase the desire 
to obtain weapons of mass destruction"8. A commentator from the Gazeta Wyborcza was clear, 
writing in August this year, that: "Iran has become a symbol of the defeat of the Bush 
administration plan for the Middle East. The country included in the "axis of evil" came out from 
Iraqi war strengthened, and America lost its influence among a considerable number of pro-
western allies. Teheran is becoming more and more tough, because they are aware, that 
nobody in the USA or in Europe - is willing to take strong action in the Middle East today." 
 
IN AMERICAN OR POLISH INTEREST? 
The approach to Polish engagement in the Iraqi mission, that was presented by officials during 
the first one and a half years, brought more and more questions, not only about the legitimacy 
of this operation, but first of all about Polish national interest and about the scope of our interests 
now and in the future. 
 
"The Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Poland" accepted by the government on 
the 22nd of July 2003, soon after joining the action, says: "Poland will continue its policy 
of commitment to the support of international peace and security, both on a regional and global 
scale. The expression of readiness to play a responsible international role is manifested by 
joining in the stabilization of Iraq (...). The size, organization and equipment of the armed forces 
will be constantly adapted to defense needs, the necessity of fulfilling international tasks as well 
as the socio-economic potential of the country."9 
As Roman Kuźniar, the head of the Institute for Strategic Studies at Warsaw University said 
in a magazine  
article- today we do not need to protect our borders from our closest neighbors, so let's also 
prepare our army and other units for operations far beyond our country, where existing situations 
are threatening. Although threats appear from within, their sources are often far distant from our 
borders. 
                                                          
8 Witold Waszczykowski, "Preliminary Observations on the Results of the War in Iraq for International 
Security and Middle East Region", The Consequences of the War in Iraq for Security of the Middle East, 
The Center for Eastern Studies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw 2003. 
9 ”The Strategy of National Security of Polish Republic”, Warsaw, 22 July 2003r, 
www.bbn.gov.pl/19.10.2004. 
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Does Poland have strategic interests in distant parts of world? Does engagement far from our 
borders really diminish or, just the opposite, increase the risk of actions of a retaliatory 
character? Is the special character of our bond with the United States, indeed a real element 
of the Polish raison d'etat? Did Poland really become an important ally of the USA thanks to its 
support in the Iraqi campaign? Is there a relationship between Polish loyalty to the USA and the 
policy of this country in regards to the Middle East and American presence in Europe, including 
its bases (at least with a "skeletal" connection with anti - missile systems) on the Polish territory? 
Shouldn't Poland manifest its independence, and charge a high price for supporting the USA? 
Why can't we get more support and means from the United States for modernization 
of the Polish army? Is it in the Polish interest to build good long-term relations with only one 
super - power? To what extent will our engagement in Iraq will bring us useful experience for 
future European policy? This is a list of basic questions, which will keep reappearing for quite 
a long time. 
 
President Aleksander Kwaśniewski said to the media: "We bet on a strategic partnership with 
the United States, because without it we would surely be in a lot worse situation. However we 
bet on both America and Europe. It is our conviction that there is no dilemma here... Iraq caused 
some tensions, but this is only an episode in history". 
 
In Polish policy regarding actions in Iraq attention initially was given to the idea, that the closer 
the co-operation with the USA the stronger the position of Poland internationally. For some time 
however, it has not been emphasized. 
 
An issue has appeared during the discussions over the last several months, particularly with our 
European partners. In a speech given by during one of the conferences by Daniel Adam Rotfeld, 
the secretary of state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his words sounded suspicious not only 
in the context of Polish participation in Iraqi operation: "Europe ... needs Germany and France 
to take into account to a larger extent the position of the United States. American presence 
in Europe - from the Polish point of view - is not only essential for security reasons, but is 
a special guarantee, that a dangerous re-nationalization of defense policies will not happen in 
Europe.”10  Several pages earlier (not in the form of a transcript but rather an account) a yet 
more telling opinion was given. Namely a disagreement with the opinion of Aleksander Smolar, 
                                                          
10 Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “Comments on the Results of the War in Iraq'', continued as in note nr 8.  
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the President of the Batory Foundation, stating that Poland is not prepared for an Iraqi mission, 
the Minister said: "Poland has to act in its own national interest, which is forced by France, 
Germany and Russia’s policy of nationalism. Poland supported the intervention in Iraq, taking 
into account new global threats demonstrated by the 11th of September as well as the fact, that 
its neighbors will not protect Polish interests, both in the context of the European Union, and in 
security issues." This very opinion coming from the person, who is the unquestionable co-author 
of present Polish foreign policy, can shed light on the real motives behind Polish participation. 
 
If this is how things are then an American defeat in Iraq would be also a great defeat for 
American allies in the national security arena, in this the loss of Poland would be greater than 
other American allies, for example Great Britain or Italy, bringing inevitable additional after-
effects for European policy. 
 
It is worth mentioning here one of the most controversial opinions expressing an alternate view 
which was published in the "Strategic Yearbook": “The American maneuver to divide Europe on 
Iraqi was part of a bigger plan of "disintegrating" Europe, which was perceived, if united, as 
a growing competitor to America. A uniform and consistent position of the European Union as 
well as main countries joining it could probably hold Washington back from the war, of which 
the negative consequences for Europe were obvious. The lack of European unity resulted 
in the absence of even the smallest influence on  
the White House decisions in terms of Iraq. Not London, Madrid, nor Warsaw had an effect. This 
gave the Bush administration an impetus to disrespect, deride, and even attempt to punish 
those, who - like Paris or Berlin - tried to oppose: the war, breaking the law, or the disassembly 
of the UN Security Council system."11  
 
 
Engagement in the Iraqi mission gave - and still gives - Poland a feeling, that it is an actor 
in an international arena and that it is an important entity. At the moment of joining the armed 
intervention - on the side of the United States, Great Britain and Australia - the element of a new 
identity seemed – next to fighting terrorism and credibility as an ally – to be a priority. With time, 
mainly as the result of tensions in transatlantic relations this feeling has started to fade. 
Warnings appeared that we should have reminded our allies about our importance, so that 
Washington would not start to treat us as someone not worth caring about. 
                                                          
11 " The Polish Strategic Yearbook 2003/2004", Foundation for International Studies, Warsaw 2004 
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Some appealed to "international prestige" and "building a new image" of Poland in the world. 
The evidence of this new phenomenon which could be recognized as satisfaction with 
the acknowledgment of the Polish role by Americans (even if this was only our perception), were 
statements by both American and Polish politicians, including a metaphorical statement by 
the former head of the National Security Bureau at the Chancellery of the President of the Polish 
Republic, Marek Siwiec, who talked about Polish promotion to the "first league". Even now, 
coming up to the Presidential elections in the United States on the 2nd of November the Polish 
media (often critical towards the USA) are looking at the republican and democratic candidates 
from the perspective of whether they mention Poland, as an ally of America. Every western 
European leader’s statement is criticized, if they question the Polish pro-American approach.  
 
The main reservations that the Polish government seemed to have had to joining 
the intervention, but of less importance then the above arguments "for", was the issue 
of the legitimacy of using power. Nevertheless, according to press reports, the head of Foreign 
Affairs said that Poland would be ready to support, but only politically, the anti-Iraqi action, 
without a suitable resolution from the UN. On the subject of the use of power and 
the international legal aspects of such an act, disputes are taking place up to this day in all 
countries of the Euro-Atlantic region and elsewhere. 
 
Summarizing, it can be concluded, that arguments given in Poland "for" the engagement of our 
country in the Iraqi operation could be divided into two categories. The first are of a general 
nature (opposing the dictatorship, protecting values, fighting terrorism, loyalty to the USA and 
the coalition led by themwhich are shared by all countries of the anti-Iraqi coalition. The second 
category is strictly connected with the security policy of Poland (belief in the USA as a guarantor 
of our security) and it is worth a separate analysis within the framework of a debate on the Polish 
raison d’etat. 
 
GREAT TEST  
 
DECISIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESIDENT  
The decision to send a military contingent was made by the government in Warsaw in March 
2003, when Iraq disregarded 14 successive resolutions of the UN Security Council, calling for 
disarmament. In the government announcement it was stressed: "We perceive Polish 
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participation in the operation as the realization of agreements between the heads of states and 
governments during the NATO Summit in Prague, regarding support for the implementation 
of resolution 1441."12  
 
The issue of the legal basis of an armed intervention in Iraq appeared again in the middle 
of September 2004, as a result of a statement by the UN Secretary General, Koffi Annan, who 
during a television interview characterized it as "illegal". Poland, in the same manner as Great 
Britain and Australia, stated in the announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that 
"it should be recognized, that decisions, that were undertaken by the international community in 
Iraq, had legal basis."13  
 
On the proposal of the Council of Ministers, the President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, decided on 
the 17th of March 2003, that a Polish Military Contingent would join the forces 
of the international coalition" to contribute to the enforcement of resolution No. 1441 of the UN 
Security Council by Iraq as well earlier resolutions related to it"14. The President told the media 
at that time: "If you ask me if I am for war or peace, I will answer that I stand for peace. If you 
ask whether we should risk the lives of Polish soldiers, even to a limited extent, I also have 
doubts. But if you were to ask me and our countrymen if they want to provide security for Poland 
and freedom from the threat of terrorism, I am convinced that the great majority would answer 
that they want the security". 
 
The government, referring to Iraq’s failure to submit to the United Nations resolution, 
in the matter of weapons of mass destruction, according to its own statement to the public, made 
a difficult decision. In the announcement there was a statement that Poland recognizes the use 
of force in international relations as an "absolute last resort". If Iraq's disarmament were not 
to be implemented  - they argued - it would be both a political and a military mistake, as well as 
illegal. The authority of the UN would suffer. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the use 
of force against Iraq was possible on basis of three resolutions: No. 678 in 1990, No. 687 
in 1991 and No. 1441 in 2002.15 
                                                          
12 Position of the Council of Ministers, in relation to the proposal for the President of Polish Republic to 
issue a decision concerning the use of Polish Military Contingent in the Make-up of the International 
Military Coalition forcing the compliance of Iraq with the UN Security Council Resolution. Warsaw, 17th 
of March 2003 http://www.kprm.gov.pl/ 2130_8934.htm / 19.10.2004. 
13 According to press reports 
14 As in note 12 
15 The Security Council: Resolution 678, 29 November 1990, http://www.iraqwatch.org/un/ 
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The decision to join the Iraqi operation was in majority supported by the opposition represented 
at the parliament by Civil Platform and Law and Justice parties. It seems, that this attitude – 
aside from political motives - was motivated by the hope for economic benefits in a two ways: 
those resulting from closer relations with the United States as well as those resulting from 
the future reconstruction of Iraq (in co-operation with the USA or aside from the bilateral 
relations). The nomination of Marek Belka for the position of Director for Economic Policy 
in the Coalition Provisional Authority strengthened these hopes. The situation looked likewise 
when the Americans tried to reward their loyal allies, promising contracts in a post-war 
reconstruction of Iraq (which led to conflicts with the European Union, because 
of the discrepancy between such moves and the principles of free trade, leading to the 
abandonment of the original plan). 
 
During the parliamentary debate at the beginning of April last year – the first one concentrating 
on the Iraqi mission - 328 Members of Parliament expressed their opinion "for" Polish 
engagement in the Iraqi operation , 71 - against it. Jan Olszewski from the Movement for 
the Reconstruction of Poland and the ex-Prime Minister said: "Making decisions without 
the opinion of the Polish parliament belittles the position of Poland at such a difficult time. 
It should be the decision of the parliament, government and the President. The basis of our 
security was - and still continues to be - the Northatlantic Treaty." Both houses of the parliament, 
tried to gain a greater influence on the decision making process in the Iraqi issue, but they were 
unsuccessful. Initiatives stayed in hands of the government and its members as well as 
the President, according to the Constitution. This approach guaranteed quicker and more 
effective decisions. However parliamentarians played a substantial direct role, inspecting 
the Polish contingent in the field. 
 
MANDATES AND TASKS  
The mandate of the Polish Military Contingent, that is intervention forces, stated that it can 
consist of a maximum of 200 soldiers meaning a 56 -person sub-unit of the Operational and 
Mobile Reconnaissance Group (GROM), supported by a 24 - person naval group, which earlier 
participated in operation "Lasting Freedom" (fulfilling the task of controlling naval units); 74-
                                                                                                                                                                                            
unscresolutions/s-res-678.htm/19.10.2004, Resolution 687, 3 April 1991, 
http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm/ 19.10.2004, Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, 
http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/ 
N0268226.pdf?OpenElement/19.10.2003. 
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people strengthened platoon responsible for decontamination (from the 4th. Chemical 
Regiment); multitask logistic support ship "Kontradmirał X. Czernicki" with 53 – crew members, 
residing in the Persian Gulf for over half a year at that time (supplying American ships of the 5th 
Fleet). 
 
All who were sent to the operation were professional soldiers. Despite the fact that according to 
the Bill of the 17th of December 199816 it was possible to order them, but an exception was 
made (again) and they were asked whether they would agree to go (this is no longer 
happening). Refusal did not entail any formal consequences. 
 
Soldiers were given special training on how to stay safe in dangerous situations, 
on the operational methods of local resistance and terrorist organizations, what safe 
correspondence should look like, and how not to engage in political discussions with strangers. 
They were acquainted with Iraqi realities. 
 
Units were placed under American and coalition command. Operational tasks were shared with 
the General Headquarters of Polish Army, in which the coordinating team was created. National 
command belonged to the Minister of Defense.17 At the same time Polish Authorities gave 
American units heading to Iraq area, permission to use Polish air space as well as land transit. 
The permission was initially granted for the period between the 19th of March and 15th 
of September 2003. The range of the operation was defined as follows: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq as well as Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. 
 
Politicians reserved the right that Polish soldiers would not be used on the front lines. Their tasks 
became officially defined as: limited special tasks, mainly logistics and support for the operations 
of coalition armies (the then Prime Minister Leszek Miller characterized it as "measured 
to the abilities of our military capabilities"). 
 
A considerable surprise was caused by the willingness to offer Poland command over one 
of the stabilization zones in Iraq. In March 2003 the possible plan to send a stabilization 
contingent by Poland was denied, and also denied by the minister of national defense, because 
                                                          
16 Dz. Ust. 1998 No. 162 item no. 1117 the law dated 17th of December 1998 about the principles of use or 
residence of the Polish Republic Armed Forces beyond the borders of the country. 
17 Operation ,”Iraqi Freedom", The Academy of National Defense, Warsaw 2003  
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"it would have a negative influence on the finances of the department". " I will not encourage 
the government to do so" - the chief of national defense said. A month later he said 
in the military weekly  magazine " Armed Poland", that "we would decide in favor of this, 
if the costs of sending and keeping Polish soldiers are not borne by Poland." At that point, we 
can suppose the matter of sending the contingent was practically settled. The Minister's opinion 
was symptomatic. It had two addressees: the USA as a "sponsor" of this action. It was possible 
to undertake this action if the army division could be assembled and transported. It was 
communicated to the other addressee, Polish public opinion, that participation in the mission 
would not bring with it great costs. In 2003 Americans covered half of the costs of the upkeep 
of the Polish contingent, including covering almost all costs of the transportation of the entire 
division; by the end of 2004 they will have spent between $350 and $400 million dollars for this, 
they are going to supply 217 all-terrain vehicles, (9 of the Hummer type) as well as 6 used C -
130 Hercules. Recently there are also discussions about unmanned aerial vehicles.18 
 
Germany and Denmark refused at that time the Polish proposal of a shared command over 
the just marked out new stabilization zone. It was the Polish intention to send to Iraq the North-
East Corps from Szczecin. Difficulties were created by this proposal (the Minister of Defense 
talked publicly about this possibility, before both governments took stands on this issue) and 
they deepened the differences of opinions between Poland and Germany especially on the issue 
of the engagement in Iraq. 
 
THE PRICE OF STABILIZATION  
The second phase of Polish participation in the Iraqi operation began under the motto 
of stabilization of the situation in this country. The basis of participation in the stabilization 
mission was established by the UN Security Council resolution No. 148319 from May of 2003, 
that is three weeks after the formal announced by the President of United States, George W. 
Bush (1st of May) about the end of war operations. On the 21st of May, the North Atlantic 
Council declared, however, that NATO would not be participating in the stabilization mission in 
Iraq. Poland could, however, expect help in preparing plans for governing the zone. Poland - as 
it seems - wanted to appeal to the entire Alliance, having hopes that it would contribute to its 
renewed consolidation and Poland will benefit from this. First it turned with a request to Spain to 
                                                          
18 Data from current specialized publications 
19 The Security Council, Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003, http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 
GEN/N03/368/ 53/PDF/N0336853.pdf?OpenElement/19.10.2004. 
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share the experience of creating the command operations and creating contacts between 
national contingents. 
 
NATO was officially asked for support in individual engagement in the stabilization mission 
on the 15th of May 2003: - "It is a normal and natural situation that the Polish side has asked 
the allied countries, to join in on informal talks on the subject of the possible use of assets 
administered by the Alliance" - commented Jerzy Szmajdziński in an interview with "Armed 
Poland". Poland was interested in help in creating operating plans, co-ordinating communication 
systems, and also sharing allied intelligence (in similar manner to NATO’s approach in the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan). During a special meeting devoted to the access to the resources 
of the Alliance, which took place in Warsaw on the 28th of May 2003, Poland asked about the 
right to use the databases of the Alliance, which contain the intelligence research information 
about the area of operation; advice on logistics issues, programming and assembling forces; 
and help from the Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) in supplying armies within 
the responsibility zone. An acceptable decision no the matter was reached on the 2nd of June, 
2003.  
 
How much Poland wanted to use NATO's help, and the extent to which this was more than what 
was given, is exemplified by the statement of the representative of the National Security Bureau, 
that one should suppose that direct participation of NATO in the international stabilization forces 
is "inevitable". Immediately after the NATO summit in Istanbul at the end of June the decision on 
training of the Iraqi forces was described as insufficient. The head of Foreign Affairs, 
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz declared that Poland saw the need for greater involvement of the 
Alliance than just the training of army and police. The spokesman of Foreign Affairs Ministry, 
Bogusław Majewski told Rzeczpospolita at the beginning of July this year that: "We would want 
NATO to take over part of the responsibility for the future stabilization of Iraq, as in Afghanistan, 
together with the engagement of the allied structures". Meanwhile the head of the Ministry 
of National Defense affirmed, that "as far as the Iraqi issue, I think that the Allied declaration 
in regards to help in the training of local security forces was all, that it was possible to get."20  
Poles assume, that thanks to the help of NATO among others, by the end of 2005 there will be 
an 80 thousand man Iraqi army, with a decent level of training and equipment. 
 
                                                          
20 Statement during the conference of the Euro - Atlantic Association (www.sea-ngo.org), “Obligations 
towards NATO", 22 July 2004. 
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The decision to participate in the stabilization forces was signed on the 6th of June 2003 by 
the President for the period between the 9th of June and 31st of December, with the possibility 
of extending it, first for a year, and then for further 6-months periods. The rotation of units was 
established at the beginning, and depended mainly on Ground Forces as one of the three (with 
the air forces and navy) types of armed forces. It was decided to leave the military component 
in place, (it was taking part in purely military intervention) later withdrawing the logistics vessel 
"Czernicki". The core of the Polish division numbering 2350 soldiers in the first round, (from 
the 31st of July 2003)were from the 12th Mechanized Division. Poles formally took over their 
zone on the 3rd of September. 
 
The second shift of the Polish contingent arrived in the middle of January 2004. It consisted 
of 2440 soldiers coming in larger extent than before from operational units. Voluntary 
professional soldiers were able to join the mission. 
 
The tasks of the stabilization forces included: creating security and public order, helping 
to create the instruments of power, ending terrorist threats, protection of places of cultural and 
religious heritage, protecting territorial integrity, help for humanitarian organizations, (In Iraq 
Poland provides policemen and Border Guards as well). 
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"IRAQI FREEDOM" Operation  
 
 
Polish forces in Iraq  
Number of soldiers: 2400  
The commander of Multinational South-Central Division: divisional gen. Andrzej Ekiert  
 
Bases: 
Babylon near Hilli: 
Polish command battalion  
Polish mechanized battalion from the Swietoszow-based 10th Armored Cavalry Brigade  
Company from the 1st Special Regiment from Lubliniec  
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In Kut: 
The independent Air - Assault Group from the 25th Brigade of Aerial Cavalry based in 
Tomaszow Mazowiecki (under the direct command of divisional commander)  
 
The command of division: brig. Gen. Jerzy Wójcik  
Polish battalion of command from Bydgoszcz 
  
In Karbala: 
Polish engineering company  
Polish medical platoon  
 
In Hilli (Babil province): 
Operational Battalion SHIRBRIG from Szczecin 
Logistic battalion from Opole  
 
 
The III shift sent to Iraq in August 2004 is based on the 16th Division from Elbląg. 
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The zone is inhabited by 3 million 200 thousand Iraqis. It consists mainly of Arabs, but also tribal 
population and Bedouins. The area of the responsibility zone: about. 29 thousand sq. km.  
 
PROVINCES  
Babil with the capital in Hilli - 618 thousand inhabitants  
Karbala, with the capital of the same name - 542 thousand 
Wasit with the capital in Kut city - 374 thousand 
(Provinces  taken over  by American forces : 
Najaf with the capital of the same name - 522 thousand 
Kadisija with the capital in Diwaniji - 200 thousand) 
Source: The Ministry of National Defense  
 
The zone of responsibility of the  multinational division under Polish command was initially 
the same with administrative borders of Iraqi provinces (Muhafazat): Babylon, Karbala, Najaf, 
Kadisija, and Wasit, from the border with Saudi Arabia to the border with Iran. In this area there 
are six large cities, of this: Karbala and Nadżaf, which are holy places for Shiites. Beginning 
on the 27th of May 2004 the zone of responsibility got smaller by two provinces, as a result 
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of the withdrawal of Spanish, Honduran and Dominican forces. It decreased from 8.5 thousand 
sq. km to 6 thousand sq. km. It now consists 17 countries down from 25. Later the Filipinos, and 
then the Thais withdrew. 
After the 9th of August the Polish commander controlled only three provinces: Babil, Karbala 
and Wasit, passing control of the remaining provinces, in which Al-Sadr's armed supporters rose 
up, to the command of the Americans.  
 
The "black series" occurred for Poles in the second half of August. Iraqi partisans, attacking 
Poles, tried to involve them in internal fights in Iraq. Polish soldiers got killed. The number 
of deaths from the beginning of the mission to the 15th of October 2004 reached about 15 Polish 
citizens, mainly soldiers. By March 2005 (the deadline is secret, but they have been moving 
since Fall) the Multinational South-Central Division will no longer have its command in Babylon 
(in order to protect monuments of this ancient city, as there have been past conflicts around this 
issue). The new place of residence (also for the Polish-Bulgarian brigade from Karbala) will be 
Diwanija, which also offers better security conditions for soldiers. The transportation of people 
and equipment is taking place escorted by the Americans. Together with the transfer 
of command there will also be an exchange of Iraqi provinces controlled up to this point by 
Poles; giving over Karbala and taking over Kadisiji. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF POSSIBILITIES  
Already by the 23rd of July 2003 the head of the Defense Ministry had ordered an analysis 
of the possible long-lasting participation of the Polish military in Iraqi mission. For the analysts 
this instruction could have meant that he had started reviewing the possibilities and abilities 
of the Polish army in the face of a new challenge. However - as is understandable - the concrete 
operating possibilities of Polish Army are not publicly discussed. Without going into details two 
main aspects are known: difficulties with assembling the contingents in the face of a lack 
of sufficiently prepared, efficient and well equipped units and on the other hand correctly 
executing existing tasks. This second aspect is especially difficult to verify. 
 
Considerably more attention is given to the "style" of mission in which Poles participate. 
The principle that multinational division under Polish command does not take part in offensive 
but only defensive actions is stressed and that it does not execute tasks on the front line, but 
rather stabilization tasks. The 1st Deputy of the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed 
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Forces, army general Mieczysław Cieniuch, stressed that Poles independently lead only 
operations connected with self-defense. 
 
It is worth  mentioning a quote illustrating this problem from a fragment of a statement given by 
Gen. Mieczysław Bieniek, the commander of the second shift of the multinational division, from 
an interview in "Armed Poland" given after his return. The journalist’s question was: How is the 
division mandate related to Iraqi reality? Answer: -"The division initially consisting of 23 and later 
17 national contingents went to participate in the stabilization mission, and against its will, due to 
the rise of Muktad al-Sadr’s militia and the attacks of his supporters, suddenly found itself 
in the middle of a home war. At some point in Karbala, Najaf and Al. Kut as well as on the supply 
lines we had open fronts of cruel battles which did not correspond to any mandates. Our law and 
equipment did not allow us to lead offensive actions. What was I supposed to do in this 
situation? Let our soldiers being killed? - To Ask Americans, who had a suitable equipment, and 
an appropriate strong mandate, to supporting us... - That is what I did! But we can't do it all with 
the allies hands. We also have to prove ourselves. Each contingent, including the Filipinos, who 
never opened fire on anyone, had its own self-defense principles, stating that as long as  
we are not attacked, we will not attack anybody."21 
 
The deaths of Polish soldiers and incidents dangerous to the security of the Polish camps (like 
the one at the end of August 2003 when after several minutes of being fired upon we could not 
return fire) brought about discussions about changing tactics and the improvement of the 
condition of our contingent’s equipment, in order not to cross the borders of necessary defense 
and to assure the right to counter-attack. The contingent was prepared for - let's remember - not 
for fighting but for participation in stabilization operations. That is why right from the start the 
decision was made not to send heavy armored equipment to Iraq. Deputy of the head of staff 
of the Ground Forces,. brig. gen. Włodzimierz Michalski, responsible for the Iraqi operation 
estimated, that greater attention than before should be focused on deterrent actions consisting 
of demonstrating the new armament, equipment, and operational conceptions. New defensive 
possibilities – the general said - will be created thanks to the additional means for fighting and 
reconnaissance, such as the MI -24 helicopters or balloon reconnaissance devices, improved 
communication systems, delivery of the armored "Scorpion" honkers. 
 
The change of operating conditions in the Polish responsibility zone was caused by 
                                                          
21 “Armed Poland", No. 33, Warsaw 2004 
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the radicalization of attitudes among the Shiite population. The attacks on bases, convoys and 
patrols gave birth to a call for the change of tactics of response. In place of response - gen. 
Koziej commented - it was suggested that we act pre-emptively. In accordance with the decision 
of the Prime Minister Marek Belka, over which there was practically no political discussion until 
the memorable announcement of minister Szmajdziński at the beginning of October, that the 
Polish contingent was to be reduced at the beginning of the 2005 to most probably 1500 
soldiers, concentrated in several larger and safer bases. It would also stop patrolling the Iraqi 
cities and limit the tasks to necessary interventions. According to gen. Czesław Piątas, 
the of head of Staff of the Polish Army Headquarters, decreasing military presence should 
depend on the ability of Iraqi services to operate independently.22 This statement showed, 
(which is how it may have seemed for a long time) the second essential foundation which was 
taken in consideration while maintaining the military presence by the Euphrates, which is 
to remain there till the moment when at least relative control over security and stability, could be 
taken over by Iraqi security forces. Until September 2004 the conception of a complete 
withdrawal of Polish forces from Iraq (at least this was the assurance) most probably did not 
exist. Only the operation of limiting of the Polish contingent was mentioned, which, according to 
the words of the head of General Headquarters, depended on the "development of situation 
in Iraq" and "improvement of Iraqi security forces". On this issue, according to assurances, 
consultations were held with allies as well as various participants of the international division, 
operating in Iraq under the Polish command. 
 
The accounting of General Headquarters did not exclude, however, keeping logistic, sapper, 
engineering and security units, and others responsible for contacts with local population in Iraq. 
At the same time, in Poland, there would be a special reserve of operating forces, ready to be 
transferred to the place of action, if the situation in Iraq were to deteriorate. The equipment, 
which was going to be left as a gift to the Iraqis, would be at our disposal in the location 
of operations. It should be asked however if a thorough economic calculation will be conducted 
in this regard. 
 
As far as the length of the presence of Polish forces in Iraq, the present government - which has 
been in power since the 2nd of May 2004 - is not consistent. The Labor Union Party expressed 
a different position. The postulate of this party - on the withdrawal of the army was submitted by 
a chairwoman and also vice-Prime Minister, Izabella Jaruga – Nowacka. It remained for quite 
                                                          
22 Press conference introduced in media on the 8th of July 2004. 
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a long time without any larger influence, in the face of agreement between government and 
President, as to leaving the Polish contingent in Iraq, basically as long as it will be needed. 
The impulse to change this approach was initiated by an appeal concerning the withdrawal 
of the Polish soldiers, by the chairman of the Polish Peasant Party, Janusz Wojciechowski. 
He announced his intention to collect signatures for an appeal, not specifying when this demand 
would have to be fulfilled. It was already the spring of 2004 when the leaders of the Polish 
Peasant Party claimed, that the present third shift of Polish forces in Iraq should be the last one. 
The chairman of party claimed during an annual celebration of the Peasant Action Holiday 
in the Sanctuary of the Sorrowful Queen of Poland in Kałków - Godów (świętokrzyskie district), 
that the war in Iraq does not serve the interests of Poland, but rather those of the USA. 
The League of Polish Families picked up the slogan of the Polish Peasant Party immediately, 
however they did not support the appeal of the Polish Peasant Party, demanding instead 
a referendum on the subject of keeping the army in Iraq.  
 
Still at the end of August the minister of national defense claimed that Poland should execute its 
mission "to the end", though limiting the size of the contingent. When his opinion changed, 
suggesting that Poles should leave Iraq no matter what the situation in the country is, it was 
remembered that independent from the pressure of the Polish Peasant Party, the League 
of the Polish Families and self-defense Parties, the Labor Union Party had wanted an exit from 
Iraq since fall. The statement of Jerzy Szmajdziński was made 10 days before the expected vote 
of confidence in the government. 
 
Admitting, that "our possible decision about the immediate removal of our armies could... cause 
a domino effect", the head of the Ministry of Defense, affirmed, that the "deadline" for 
the complete withdrawal of the Polish contingent should be the "date of expiration of the UN 
Security Council resolution No. 1546."23 This should also be the deadline for removal of our 
armies. This obviously does not mean, that if our stabilization mission were to be continued, 
the Polish army would withdraw from Iraq completely. Surely some group of observers would 
remain. For this however another UN Security Council resolution would be necessary". 
He further stated: "Except for the fact that expiration of the UN resolution is essential, yet 
another factor is important. This regards what is called our military abilities. It does not mean that 
our supplies are ending, but two and a half years of a mission in such difficult conditions is a lot 
                                                          
23 The Security Council, Resolution 1546, 8 June 2004, http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 
GEN/N04/381/16/ PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement/19.10.2003. 
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for the army, which really just attains new abilities and introduces new equipment ". 
 
Despite the varied, generally critical reactions to the statement mentioned above, (which was not 
discussed with the Prime Minister or the head of Foreign Affairs) it opens a door to a new 
approach to the Iraqi issue both in domestic and foreign policy. as well as altering the previously 
existing approach. The option of withdrawing may satisfy the critics of a prolonged, (in their 
opinion) military presence in Iraq, but surely it also has an implied meaning connected with 
the pre-election political party game . On the international scale it can open up new options. 
 
However after the meeting of the heads of the defense departments of coalition countries 
(including Iraq, Bahrain and Qatar), which took place on the" USS John F. Kennedy" aircraft 
carrier in the Persian Gulf (during the period between the statement of Jerzy Szmajdziński and 
the expected government declaration by the Prime Minister during the parliamentary debate on 
the 15th of October 2004) the minister talked only about a "decrease" in the stabilization forces 
contingent.  
 
This was also the perspective sketched by Prime Minister Marek Belka in his opening speech, 
supporting the intention to reduce the contingent, without announcing a date for withdrawal: 
"We will not stay in Iraq an hour longer than reason dictates."24 None of the statements 
of the Prime Minister suggest, whether the above declaration means returning to the previous 
form of engagement, assuming that military presence in Iraq is dependent on the situation in the 
country. The deadline of withdrawal - after the parliamentary elections in Iraq planned for 
January 2005 - also remains unclear. It would also be difficult to conclude from the later 
statement of the head of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, to what extent Poles would 
be present in Iraq. He affirmed, according to the Polish Press Agency, that "after the elections 
we would like to start reducing the size of our army in Iraq. However, understanding our duties, 
we will have to judge the situation in this country ." 
 
In all statements from the middle of October 2004, by the President, prime minister and both 
ministers, one common element emerges; not making the decision depend on the USA, at least 
directly, although all politicians could take in account the unknown results of the presidential 
elections on the 2nd November and the unclear American policy in the Middle East. 
                                                          
24 Pronouncement at Lower house of parliament of Prime Minister Marek Belka before the vote of 
confidence 
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VALUABLE EXPERIENCES  
The plan for the development of the armed forces for the years 2003-2008 did not imply 
a reduction in the size of the Polish army or a change of structures. It included, however, 
improvement of operating abilities and the military potential based on national defense strategy 
as well as the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) of November 2002. The "Program 2003 -
2008" was an answer to changes in the security environment, including new threats, first of all 
terrorism as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their 
transport, but without reference to practical situations, with which the Polish units were 
confronted during Iraqi mission. (The plans were prepared gradually, according to a "step by 
step" formula, so that some elements could be gradually implemented). Lessons from Iraq are 
to be considered in the plan for the development of the armed forces for 2005 -2010.  
 
According to all accessible military sources25 the experiences gathered in the course of the Iraqi 
mission proved to be valuable hints for the organization and modernization of the national armed 
forces. The "Iraqi Freedom" operation delivered information about military abilities and 
the organization of armed forces - both of Iraq and the coalition, showing the propensities 
of modern armies. Not all experiences were used in development because not all of them are 
worth using 
. 
These experiences could be divided into two categories: 
First are the universal experiences, which could and should be used in organizing 
the expeditionary missions of the new type, not only by Poland. The second one including 
conclusions for the Polish armed forces (and the distinction between the two should be flexible). 
It is concerned with conclusions arrived at from practical experience during logistical operations, 
which in the case of Poland was unprecedented: replacement of a 5 thousand person contingent 
using 22 airplanes going back and fourth (80-90 kg per man and additionally 60-70 kg 
of baggage) a distance of almost 4.5 thousand kilometers, with some support from civilian 
companies. It turned out that Poland needs a means of strategic transportation as well as better 
base for the transfer of armies to the place of operations. In command battalions the creation 
of security companies was indicated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Warsaw 15 October 2004 r., www.kprm.gov.pl/1433_12416.htm/20.10.2004 
25 Publishing house of the Academy of National Defense, "Difficult stabilization", Warsaw 2004. 
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The experiences regarding the type and quality of equipment were gained gradually. And so the 
third shift (that is the contingent residing in the place of operation in the second half of 2004) 
was better equipped with night - vision and communication devices, and now the armored 
honkers "Scorpions" are being delivered .  
 
In Poland the conviction seems to prevail that it is proper to participate in the widest coalition 
of countries. Because of that interactions are valued, as well as the ability to command large 
multinational formations on the level of brigades and sub-units. Command, managing and 
planning on the strategic level play very important roles but in the conditions of a modern 
battlefield the lowest levels of command become more important. Probably the most valuable 
experience acquired in Iraq is the skill of commanding a large military formation, considerably 
larger than during earlier peace missions conducted by the Polish Army.  
 
The command of the multinational division under Polish command consisted at a certain point 
of 356 people from 25 countries. Div. Gen. (now army gen.) Mieczysław Bieniek, who was 
the commander during the second shift affirmed with pride, that: "In some sense a multinational 
division is a perfect creature. There is no other institution like this in the world, our 
multinationality makes us almost perfect". However, this politically correct and attractive thesis is 
by many considered controversial. (It would be enough to trace the discussion on this subject, 
about creating European military forces). 
 
Furthermore - as the available accounts suggest -there is a need for strengthening the logistics 
of maneuvers, creating a third hospital for the peace mission, improvement of the systems 
of command, so that they allow command over joint operations in real time, and more flexible 
battalions, from which it would be possible to create smaller modules for the support of other 
battalions. 
 
Crucial military, but also political abilities could be achieved by increasing the ability to lead 
intelligence, reconaisanse as well as counter - espionage actions both for the achievement 
of the political aims or of military operations. It would also be beneficial for the decision making 
process during army operations, for example in anti-missile and anti-aircraft defense systems as 
well as detection of their sources. The head of Military Information Services, gen. Marek 
Dukaczewski admitted, that "despite the success of operations in many areas of intelligence 
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activity" "considerable problems" appeared.26 This issue has exceptional political meaning for 
the future, as it relates to minimizing the risk of going into action based only on foreign 
information, even if it is introduced by a country creating an alliance or a "volunteer coalition", as 
in the case of Iraq. 
 
The operations of a military character as well as the mission of enforcing peace in Iraq 
unambiguously showed, (according to the analysts observing its development) that it was 
necessary to be prepared for action with the use light forces (which was confirmed by earlier 
research and is consistent with the principles of the future missions). That is: all agree, that 
the main challenge for the Polish armed forces in the light of the Iraqi experience is a gradual 
preparation of expeditionary forces, which would be possible to be moved easily into regions 
of conflict. 
 
In accordance with the ideas of the commanders, including the commander of air forces, army 
gen. Ryszard Olszewski, Ph.D., it would be good to reach to a certain degree the ability 
to accomplish missions beyond our borders. It would also be beneficial to gain the information 
necessary for operations during the day and at night, to initiate modern systems of offensive and 
defensive equipment including unmanned aerial vehicles as well as centers of electronic 
warfare; to modernize the systems of reconnaissance and identification, to be ready for full co-
operation with the AWACS system; and development of a program of re-fueling in the air. 
The air force decided to take steps to better protect Polish aircraft, helicopters and other 
machines operating outside the borders of Poland, and to train staff which would be able to join 
multinational units maintaining airports, used for, among other things, supplying military units. 
 
Ground forces as the main source of soldiers for peace missions of different types, are led 
in their development mainly by the NATO decisions for preparing 40 percent of the forces 
needed for expeditionary missions. 8 percent of the forces had to be designed for immediate 
response. For the commander of Ground Forces, army gen. Edward Pietrzyk the war in Iraq was 
a "clash of commanders, squads, platoons, companies and battalions", but not wanting 
to diminish the role of command and planning on the strategic level, we should be aware, that 
"in the  terrible dynamics of operations of the present battlefield the final role is given to the 
lowest levels of command". 
 
                                                          
26 " Scientific Notebooks", No.4, Academy of National Defense, Warsaw, 2003. 
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It is widely recognized that the growing role of forces and special operations showing the ability 
of quick response in situations, when for various reasons: organizational, technical, or political - 
use of other components of the armed forces are not possible or advisable.  
 
In the Main Headquarters of the Polish Army the work of creating the Joint Operation Command 
(the Operating Command) was speeded up. Reading the materials published after different 
conferences one could conclude that among Polish strategists there is a shared opinion that 
the "Iraqi Freedom" operation was a good example of command over a joint allied operation. 
The command will begin functioning on the 1st of July 2005 and will be responsible for 
controlling all Polish contingents residing outside of its borders. It will be responsible for the so-
called "conferences for the generation of forces". 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
PUBLIC OPINION - IN MAJORITY OPPOSED  
• In the middle of March 2003, that is in the moment of undertaking crucial decisions about 
Polish participation in Iraqi mission as well as before the first parliamentary debate - according 
to. OBOP (Public Opinion Research Center) - 69 percent of Poles were against sending 
the army into the Iraqi region, 21 percent supported such a step. But, according to. "Gazeta 
Wyborcza" (18th of March) even the opponents agreed that it was proper, however, to send 
support units, to the back lines. 
• The death of the first Pole lieutenant colonel Hieronim Kupczyk from the 12th Mechanized 
Division, during the Iraqi mission took place on the 6th of November 2003. It was also the first 
case of direct deadly fire in the over 50 year history of Polish participation in peace missions. 
In December 2003 a lack of acceptance was observed among 67 percent of Poles, according to 
the CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center), and at the same time the support decreased from 
37 to 28 percent. According to every third person in the face of intensifying attacks against 
soldiers and civil workers, the coalition countries should withdraw their armies. 19 percent 
believed, however, that stabilization forces should be strengthened. Three fourths of Poles 
estimated that Poland could become the aim of terrorist attacks, and only 18 percent were not 
afraid of that.  
• In first half of August 2004, according to the CBOS polls, almost two thirds of Poles wanted 
the soldiers to come back home as soon as possible. One third supported leaving them in Iraq. 
The poll was conducted before the series of the tragic deaths and the escalation of Sadrs 
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supporters. 81 percent of Poles recognized the terrorist threat as real, and for 13 percent it was 
not a problem. 
• According to the CBOS polls conducted at the beginning of October, the number of people 
opposed to the participation of the Polish armies in the stabilization mission grew about 
4 percent in comparison with September, however the percentage of Poles supporting 
the operation decreased - from 40 to 37percent. 
• A steady component is high support of Iraqi mission among people sympathizing with Civil 
Platform as well as Justice and Law parties, among educated people who are interested 
in politics. The strongest opponents of Polish presence in Iraq are people connected with 
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